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The Effect of Fraud Assessment Documentation Structure on Auditors’ Ability to Identify 
Control Weaknesses: The Moderating Role of Reviewer Experience 
 
ABSTRACT: The current regulatory environment, brought on by recent high-profile audit 
failures, expands the auditor’s role in detecting fraud. For example, auditors must now provide 
an opinion on clients’ internal controls, addressing their effectiveness at preventing or detecting 
fraud. While the structure of workpaper documentation has been shown to affect audit workpaper 
preparers’ assessments of overall fraud risk, prior research has not addressed the role their 
reviewers’ experience plays in mitigating documentation structure effects. Our study matches 
audit workpaper preparers with reviewers to investigate whether reviewer task-specific 
experience moderates the effect of fraud assessment documentation structure on the audit review 
team’s ability to identify the presence of significant control weaknesses. Consistent with 
expectations, we find that preparers who are required to document components of their fraud 
assessments provided more favorable (and lower quality) assessments of significant control 
weaknesses than those using either a supporting or balanced documentation structure. More 
importantly, results indicate that reviewer task-specific experience moderated the effect of 
documentation structure on reviewers’ identification of control weaknesses such that experienced 
reviewers compensated more for the effect of component documentation than reviewers with less 
experience. Our results suggest that experienced reviewers are better able to overcome 
challenges presented by documentation structure and more effectively assess the impact of 
control weaknesses than their less experienced counterparts. These results provide support for 
new regulations emphasizing the role of experience during the control assessment process. 
 
Keywords:  review process; control environment; fraud; control weakness; audit 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the role of reviewer task-specific experience in moderating the 
effect of fraud assessment documentation structure on the on audit review team’s ability to 
identify significant control weaknesses.1 Recent high-profile audit failures have prompted 
Congress and standard setting bodies to pass new regulations that emphasize and expand the 
auditor’s role in detecting and preventing fraud (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99). Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act now requires 
management of public companies to assess the effectiveness of their internal controls, and to 
include this assessment with their annual SEC filings. Auditors must now not only provide an 
opinion on management’s assertions, but also conduct their own independent assessment of, and 
issue an opinion on, the effectiveness of their client’s internal controls. These new tasks are in 
addition to their continuing responsibilities relating to financial statement assurance. This 
increased workload in the new regulatory environment has pushed public accounting firms to 
dramatically increase recruiting on college campuses (Arndt 2004; Gomez 2004; The Daily 
News of Los Angeles 2004), increasing the ratio of staff auditors to more experienced managers 
and partners at a time when experience is deemed to be one of the more important attributes 
when assessing internal controls (PCAOB 2003).  
Research on auditor experience indicates that task-specific experience improves auditors’ 
judgments. Specifically, task-specific experience obtained through task performance and review 
of others’ performance in an area can lead to expert decision-making (Bonner 1990). Task-
specific experience provides the opportunity for the development of enhanced knowledge 
structures, which improves auditors’ decision-making effectiveness (Biggs et al. 1987; Shelton 
                                                 
1 Similar to Trotman (1985), we define a review team as consisting of a hierarchical pair of auditors: a subordinate 
auditor who prepares the workpapers and a supervising auditor who reviews this work, with the review team’s 
efforts culminating in the judgments/decisions of the reviewing auditor. 
1999). Therefore, a reviewer’s experience with fraud risk assessments (i.e., task-specific 
experience) can be expected to influence his/her effectiveness in identifying control weaknesses 
that present opportunities for fraud. This is important because a key function of the review 
process is to help ensure the appropriateness of conclusions drawn by less-experienced auditors 
(Shelton 1999). Reviewer experience becomes even more critical in situations where the 
reviewer has to overcome shortcomings of workpaper documentation prepared by less 
experienced auditors (Libby and Trotman 1993). Given the influx of new staff-level hires to 
supervise, the pool of highly experienced reviewers may be in short supply (Cummins 2005; 
Marquez 2005).  
When auditors make assessments, they are typically required to document their 
conclusions in the audit workpapers. This documentation will later be scrutinized by those 
supervising their work. In practice, the format of such documentation may vary. Since this 
documentation may serve as a source of evidence in the event of litigation, it is important to 
consider the different ways in which auditors may structure such documentation (Koonce et al. 
1995). Agoglia et al. (2003) show that varying the format of a justification memo affects the 
overall control environment assessments and evidence documented by reviewed auditors 
(preparers) as well as the judgments of their reviewers. Our study extends prior research by 
examining whether reviewer task-specific experience moderates the effect of fraud assessment 
documentation structure on the review team’s ability to identify specific control weaknesses that 
present opportunities for fraud (as is now required by Section 404 and PCAOB Auditing 
Standard No. 2). 
We presented auditors (preparers) a case with control environment evidence for a 
hypothetical client that was based on the control environment of an actual firm that had 
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experienced fraud. Preparers were asked to compile documentation regarding the client’s control 
environment and to identify control environment weaknesses with regard to fraud. Specifically, 
preparers were required to document the control environment’s ability to prevent fraudulent 
activities using evidence to support their assessments (supporting documentation), using both 
important positive and important negative evidence about the control environment (balanced 
documentation), or using important positive and negative evidence regarding components of the 
control environment (component documentation). Preparers were then presented with ten fraud 
risk factors identified in SAS No. 99 (AICPA 2002) and asked to assess how likely each was to 
be a problem area for the client.2 A reviewer was paired with each preparer and asked to review 
the fraud assessment documentation. Reviewers then provided their own assessment of how 
likely each of the ten fraud risk factors was to be a problem with regard to the client’s control 
environment. 
Results indicate preparers using the component documentation structure were less 
effective at identifying control weaknesses than those using either the supporting or balanced 
documentation structures. More importantly, the results indicate that task-specific reviewer 
experience plays a significant role in mitigating the effect of fraud assessment documentation 
structure on auditor fraud risk judgments. Specifically, reviewer experience moderated the effect 
of component documentation on the identification of control weaknesses. This result suggests 
that, relative to reviewers with lesser task-specific fraud assessment experience, reviewers with 
greater experience appear to be better able to overcome judgment difficulties encountered by the 
novice preparers. Thus, the emphasis on experience during the control assessment process 
prescribed by recent pronouncements (e.g., PCAOB 2004a; SAS No. 99) seems well placed. 
                                                 
2 Fraud risk factors represent potential weaknesses in controls, with respect to their ability to prevent/detect fraud. 
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
theoretical background and hypotheses. This is followed by a description of the research method 
and a presentation of the results. The final section offers conclusions and implications. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Current Professional Environment 
The accounting profession is undergoing significant changes as a result of a number of 
high profile corporate scandals. Both Congress and the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) have 
acted to impose greater responsibilities on auditors with respect to fraud and internal controls. 
Congress acted with their passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the ASB implemented 
SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 2002). Under SAS 
No. 99, auditors are required to gather and consider more information to assess fraud risk than 
they have in the past, as well as explicitly document their assessment in the workpapers. Among 
other responsibilities, SAS No. 99 requires that, when obtaining information about the client and 
its environment, the auditor should consider the presence of fraud risk factors. SAS No. 99 (para. 
31) defines fraud risk factors as “events or conditions that indicate incentives/pressures to 
perpetuate fraud, opportunities to carry out the fraud, or attitudes/rationalizations to justify 
fraudulent actions.”3 Although fraud risk factors do not necessarily indicate that fraud is present, 
they often are present when fraud does exist and are, therefore, important elements to consider 
within the scope of an audit engagement.  
As part of compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, managers must 
evaluate the effectiveness of their internal control procedures and auditors must attest to the 
                                                 
3 SAS No. 99 provides examples of fraud risk factors related to fraudulent financial reporting (e.g., revenue 
recognition policies and management estimate issues) and misappropriation of assets (e.g., inadequate controls over 
cash and inventory items).  
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accuracy of their client’s assertions.4 PCAOB Auditing Standard (AS) No. 2 addresses the 
importance of controls over possible fraud. As a result of this standard, auditors now conduct 
their own independent assessment of (and issue an opinion on) internal controls, with respect to 
their effectiveness at preventing or detecting fraud that may result in material misstatement of the 
financial statements. Thus, while it has always been important to the performance of the audit, 
the auditor’s responsibility for identifying and documenting control weaknesses has increased 
exponentially in the new regulatory environment. Further, PCAOB AS No. 3 addresses audit 
documentation. AS No. 3 states that auditors who prepare (e.g., preparer) audit documentation 
should provide sufficient information to enable an experienced auditor (e.g., reviewer) to 
understand the procedures performed, evidence obtained, and conclusions reached, including 
relevant information inconsistent with conclusions (PCAOB 2004b). This recent guidance 
highlights the importance of audit documentation quality and its significance for those who 
review the documentation. 
 
Alternative Documentation Structures 
Auditors are typically required to document their conclusions in the workpapers, which 
will later be scrutinized by those supervising their work. Audit workpapers contain 
documentation relating to various aspects of the audit such as planning, internal control 
evaluations, and audit procedures performed. The form this documentation takes, however, can 
vary in practice. Given that this documentation typically provides rationale for the auditor’s 
opinion and often serves as key sources of legal evidence in the event of litigation (Koonce et al. 
                                                 
4 Internal control assessment involves ensuring that steps are in place to prevent or detect the theft or unauthorized 
use of the company’s assets to the extent that such prohibited acts could result in a material effect on the financial 
statements.  The control environment, a component of internal control, “sets the tone of the organization, influencing 
the control consciousness of its people” and is the “foundation” upon which all other internal controls rest (AICPA 
1995, para. 25).  
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1995), it is important to consider the potential effect of the documentation’s structure on audit 
judgment.  
Related research has focused on comparing the differences in judgments between 
auditors required, or not required, to justify their decisions (e.g., Johnson and Kaplan 1991; 
Koonce et al. 1995; Peecher 1996; Hoffman and Patton 1997). Although this research indicates 
that justification can affect audit judgments, it does not examine the effects of how that 
documented justification is structured. A recent study examines the effects of alternatively 
structured justification memos on audit judgments. Agoglia et al. (2003) find that the format of 
these justifications (i.e., how the workpapers require them to be structured) can affect the overall 
fraud risk assessments of auditors preparing this documentation as well as those of auditors 
reviewing their work. Following Agoglia et al. (2003), we investigate three different structures in 
which preparers can document their fraud assessments: (1) supporting documentation, which 
requires preparers to provide evidence supporting their conclusions; (2) balanced documentation, 
which requires preparers to document important positive and negative evidence (e.g., both 
strengths and weaknesses of a client’s control environment); and (3) component documentation, 
which requires preparers to document important positive and negative information for 
components of their task (e.g., strengths and weaknesses of components of the control 
environment).5  
The results of Agoglia et al. (2003) indicate that component justification memos result in 
the greatest amount of evidence documented and the lowest overall fraud risk levels assessed by 
preparers, relative to balanced and supporting memos. They attribute this result to the fact that 
auditors using component memos documented more total evidence items than auditors in the 
                                                 
5 While not intended to represent an exhaustive list of possible documentation structures, these three documentation 
structures were chosen to be consistent with prior research and because they represent structures similar to those that 
have been used in practice (Agoglia et al. 2003).  
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other memo conditions. If a large amount of evidence is documented, the relative weight given to 
each evidence item is likely to decrease (Pincus 1989), which may affect an auditor’s judgments 
when the proportion of positive and negative evidence is imbalanced. For example, if a client’s 
control environment has only a small number of weaknesses, the relative weight given to these 
weaknesses is likely to decrease as the overall set of evidence considered increases (e.g., 
Hackenbrack 1992; Glover 1997; Hoffman 1997; Shelton 1999). Given that even troubled clients 
typically have a greater proportion of positive control environment characteristics than negative 
characteristics (Agoglia et al. 2003), the increased documentation requirements for our 
component documentation structures will tend to result in a greater focus on positive evidence. 
In turn, component documentation preparers may be less likely to identify significant control 
weaknesses as areas of concern than supporting or balanced preparers. Thus, we expect that 
documentation structure will affect review teams’ ability to identify specific control weaknesses 
(an important task given their new responsibilities relating to fraud and internal control) in much 
the same way as it has been found to affect overall assessments of the control environment. It is 
necessary to first establish that this effect exists in order to investigate the role reviewer 
experience plays in moderating it. Therefore, the following hypothesis is tested:  
H1: Component documentation preparers will assess control environment weaknesses 
more favorably than preparers using supporting or balanced documentation. 
 
Reviewer Task-Specific Experience 
When auditors make assessments, they are typically required to document their 
conclusions in the audit workpapers, which are subject to review by a supervising auditor (Emby 
and Gibbins 1988; Brazel et al. 2004). Prior research examining the review process demonstrates 
that altering the format of a justification memo can affect not only the judgments of workpaper 
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preparers, but those of their reviewers as well (Agoglia et al. 2003). However, this prior research 
does not consider the role of reviewer experience on the effect of documentation structure. 
Reviewer experience may be an important variable to consider since a primary function of the 
hierarchical review process is to reduce the likelihood of the audit being compromised by the 
judgments of less-experienced auditors (Solomon 1987; Shelton 1999; Brazel et al. 2004), a task 
at which reviewer experience should play a crucial role (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2004a). 
Research on auditor experience indicates that auditors’ judgments improve with greater 
experience. Bonner and Lewis (1990) show that auditors with more experience generally 
perform more effectively than auditors with less experience. Experience provides an opportunity 
for the acquisition of relevant technical knowledge, which is essential for improving task 
performance (Libby 1995). As a result, auditors with more experienced-based knowledge usually 
make better decisions than auditors with less (Libby and Luft 1993). For example, Knapp and 
Knapp (2001) show that, with greater levels of experience, auditors become more effective at 
assessing the risk of financial statement fraud. Prior research also suggests that task-specific 
experience improves auditors’ judgments. Task-specific experience, obtained through exposure 
to an area, can lead to expert decision making (Bonner 1990). As a result of their well-developed 
knowledge structures, expert auditors tend to use directed strategies to acquire information 
pertinent to a specific decision or task, resulting in more effective decision making (Biggs et al. 
1987; Shelton 1999).  
The knowledge structures developed through task-specific experience (e.g., experience 
performing and reviewing evaluations of the effectiveness of a client’s control environment) 
should help reviewers to focus their reviews on more relevant evidence items (Biggs et al. 1987; 
Shelton 1999), allowing them to better identify the true nature of a specific fraud risk factor(s). 
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Thus, reviewers with greater task-specific experience are likely to be less influenced by their 
preparers’ conclusions/documentation (i.e., better equipped to formulate an independent 
evaluation of the evidence), particularly in situations where the preparer’s assessment does not 
appropriately reflect conditions at the client. This is consistent with Monroe and Ng (2000), who 
view the auditor risk assessment process as belief revision task, with a prior assessment serving 
as a starting point, or “anchor.” This anchor is then revised, often insufficiently, to create a 
current assessment. In cases where preparer assessments do not fully reflect conditions at the 
client, reviewers with lower task-specific experience may be less able to properly assess the 
impact of specific fraud risk factors on the firm’s control environment given their less-developed 
knowledge structures. Therefore, these reviewers may be more likely to anchor on their 
preparers’ fraud risk factor assessments and, in turn, their assessments may deviate less from 
those of their preparers. In contrast, more experienced reviewers’ knowledge structures should 
enable them to better identify and react to specific weaknesses affecting the firm’s control 
environment, resulting in assessments that deviate farther from their preparers’ assessments than 
those of less experienced reviewers.  
Therefore, more experienced reviewers’ knowledge structures should allow them to more 
effectively overcome any challenges presented by documentation structure and better assess the 
impact of fraud risk factors on the firm’s control environment than their less experienced 
counterparts. With respect to the three documentation structures investigated here, more 
experienced reviewers will be better equipped to overcome the potential oversights of preparers 
in the component documentation condition (i.e., relative to those with less experience, 
experienced component reviewers are more likely to identify control weaknesses that their 
preparers may have overlooked). If the supporting and balanced conditions result in better 
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preparer documentation and assessments, then there is less of a burden on the reviewer and 
reviewer experience becomes less of a factor. Thus, we expect that reviewer task-specific 
experience will moderate the effect of documentation structure on the difference between 
preparer-reviewer control weakness assessments. That is, given the expectation presented in H1, 
we expect preparer-reviewer assessment differences to be greatest when preparers document 
their assessments using component documentation and the reviewer is more experienced. The 
following hypothesis is, therefore, tested: 
H2: As reviewer task-specific experience increases, differences between preparer and 
reviewer assessments of control environment weaknesses will be greater for 
component documentation audit teams than for supporting or balanced 
documentation audit teams.     
 
 
METHOD 
Participants 
 One hundred and eight practicing auditors from large international accounting firms 
participated in the study (54 as preparers and 54 as reviewers). Auditors participating as 
preparers were generally audit seniors with an average of 4.0 years experience, while auditors 
participating as reviewers were generally audit managers with an average of 8.7 years 
experience.6 Discussions with audit partners indicate that auditors with these levels of experience 
should be familiar with evaluating control environments and reviewing these evaluations, 
respectively.  
 
                                                 
6 Demographic variables including familiarity with authoritative guidance, effort expended, and pressure to perform 
the task were tested and did not have a significant effect on the overall findings. 
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Experimental Case 
The experimental materials utilize a detailed case based on the audit of an actual 
company that experienced a misappropriation of assets (i.e., fraud).7 The case materials included 
background information on the client and detailed information regarding the client’s control 
environment. The information was presented in the form of audit team member comments 
provided across the seven control environment dimensions incorporated in SAS No. 78 (AICPA 
1995). The seven dimensions are: integrity and ethical values, commitment to competence, board 
of directors and audit committee, management’s philosophy and management style, organization 
structure, the assignment of authority and responsibility, and human resource policies and 
practices. The evidence set presented to participants was extensive, containing 126 separate 
evidence items. 
 
Preparer Task 
 Preparers were randomly assigned to a fraud assessment documentation structure 
condition, provided a case booklet, and required to prepare and document an assessment of the 
control environment’s ability to prevent fraudulent activities. The instructions required preparers 
to structure their assessment documentation in one of three ways: using evidence that supports 
their assessment of the client’s control environment (supporting documentation), using both 
positive and negative evidence about the control environment (balanced documentation), and 
using positive and negative evidence about components of the control environment (component 
documentation). After completing the documentation, they assessed the impact of ten randomly 
ordered specific fraud risk factors (6 control strengths and 4 control weaknesses) on the control 
                                                 
7 The experimental materials were adapted from those developed and employed by Agoglia et al. (2003) and 
updated to reflect the current auditing environment. 
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environment’s ability to prevent fraud.8 Specifically, preparers were asked whether each factor 
was likely or unlikely to be a problem area. Responses were made on 10-point scales, with 
endpoints labeled “highly unlikely to be a problem area” (coded as 10) and “highly likely to be a 
problem area” (coded as 1). Preparer participants then responded to a series of demographic and 
case-related questions. 
 
Reviewer Task 
Reviewers received the same client background and control environment information as 
preparers. They were randomly matched with a preparer and reviewed that individual’s fraud 
assessment documentation, which had been structured using one of the three documentation 
conditions. After reviewing their preparer’s control environment assessment documentation, 
reviewers were provided with a list of the ten specific fraud risk factors, along with their 
preparer’s assessments of these factors. Reviewers were asked to assess whether each of the ten 
fraud risk factors was a potential problem area for the client on the same ten point scales as those 
utilized by the preparers. Like the preparer participants, reviewers also responded to a series of 
demographic and case-related questions. 
 
                                                 
8 The ten specific fraud risk factors related to the control environment and were taken from SAS No. 99, 
Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA 2002).  Two individuals involved with the actual 
audit examined the case materials to identify whether each fraud risk factor was likely or unlikely to be a problem 
area with respect to the control environment’s ability to prevent fraud.  Based on the evidence provided in the case 
materials, four of the ten fraud risk factors were determined to be serious problem areas (i.e., significant 
weaknesses), while the remaining six were determined to be areas of strength.  The four problem areas are: (1) 
management’s attitude toward overriding controls, (2) degree of oversight related to the company’s control structure 
exercised by management, (3) controls related to safeguarding of assets, and (4) segregation of duties, particularly 
for personnel in key functions.  Fraud risk factor categorization as a weakness or strength was confirmed by three 
experts (audit partners) not involved with the actual audit engagement.  These expert responses were used to 
determine the appropriateness of participants’ fraud risk assessments.   
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RESULTS 
Hypothesis One 
 Hypothesis 1 predicts that component documentation preparers would assess control 
environment weaknesses as less problematic for the client than preparers using supporting or 
balanced documentation. To test H1, we analyzed preparers’ responses in a 1 x 3 ANOVA with 
documentation structure (supporting, balanced, or component) as the independent variable and 
participants’ mean assessments of four control environment weaknesses as the dependent 
variable. Participants indicated how likely each factor was to be a problem with regard to the 
control environment’s ability to prevent fraud on a 10-point scale (where 1 = “highly likely to be 
a problem area” and 10 = “highly unlikely to be a problem area”). Thus, lower (higher) scores 
indicate that the participant perceived a control environment weakness (strength) with respect to 
that risk factor. Table 1 presents participants’ assessments of the four control environment 
weaknesses. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that preparers’ mean assessments (across the four control 
environment weaknesses) were 3.89, 3.94, and 5.61, respectively, for the supporting, balanced, 
and component documentation groups (F = 7.930, p = .001). Contrast tests presented in Panel B 
indicate that the mean assessment of the component group was significantly higher (i.e., 
component preparers assessed the four factors as lower risk) than both the balanced and 
supporting groups (both p’s < .001). Similar results are observed for each of the four control 
weaknesses individually (see Table 1). Consistent with H1, these data suggest that the 
component documentation preparers viewed control weaknesses more favorably than preparers 
in the supporting or balanced groups. Specifically, preparers using component documentation 
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indicated that there was a lower likelihood that these control environment weaknesses would be a 
problem with regard to the control environment’s ability to prevent fraud. It appears that, 
consistent with the development of H1, the increased documentation requirements for the 
component documentation structure resulted in a greater focus on positive evidence, in turn 
leading to more favorable assessments of control weaknesses observed for component group 
preparers. We find that preparers in the component group documented significantly more 
positive evidence items (62.8% of their total documented evidence), on average, than either the 
supporting or balanced groups (43.5% and 49.6%, p = .001 and p = .023, respectively).9  
 In addition, we examine the quality of the preparers’ assessment. Similar to Tan (1995), 
assessment quality is measured as the absolute deviation of preparer assessments from expert 
assessments of the four control environment weaknesses, where more (less) deviation from 
expert assessments indicates lower (higher) preparer assessment quality.10 Preparers’ mean 
absolute deviations from experts’ assessments were 1.69, 1.64, and 2.89 for the supporting, 
balanced and component groups, respectively. Contrast tests indicate that component preparers’ 
mean absolute deviations from the experts was significantly higher than both the supporting (p = 
.003) and balanced groups (p = .002). Thus, it appears that not only were component preparers’ 
control weakness assessments more favorable than those of preparers in the supporting and 
balanced groups, they were also of lower quality. 
Recall that preparers were also asked to assess the impact of six control strengths on the 
control environment’s ability to prevent fraud. Interestingly, and contrary to what we found for 
                                                 
9 On average, preparers in the component group documented 51.9 total evidence items (33.4 positive items), while 
those in the supporting and balanced groups documented 21.0 (7.9 positive) and 27.9 (14.6 positive) items, 
respectively. 
10 Expert assessments came from three experts (audit partners) not involved with the actual audit engagement upon 
which the experimental case is based.  For each participant, absolute deviations are calculated for each of the four 
control weaknesses individually and then averaged across the four items to produce a mean absolute deviation from 
expert assessments (i.e., our measure of “assessment quality”). 
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the four control weaknesses, documentation structure had no significant affect on preparers’ 
assessments of the control strengths (means = 6.89, 7.43, and 7.28 for the supporting, balanced, 
and component groups, respectively; p = .492). These results indicate that the preparers in the 
supporting and balanced conditions were not simply more conservative across the board (i.e., all 
three groups were equally effective at recognizing control strengths), but that they were better 
able to selectively direct attention to areas of weakness (i.e., they were better able to identify and 
appropriately assess the weaknesses present at the hypothetical client) than those in the 
component group. 
 
Hypothesis Two  
Given the H1 results, which establish the prerequisite effect of documentation structure 
on preparers’ assessments of control weaknesses, we now turn our attention to H2 and the role of 
reviewer experience in moderating the effect of documentation structure. To test H2, we ran the 
following multivariate regression:  
 
DIFFi = a0 + a1TSE + a2SUP + a3BAL + a4TSE*SUP + a5TSE*BAL + e  (1) 
  
  
DIFF represents the difference between preparer and reviewer responses. Specifically, DIFF is 
calculated as the preparer’s minus the reviewer’s mean assessment for the four control 
weaknesses. TSE represents reviewers’ task-specific experience.11 Specifically, reviewers were 
asked how much experience they had in reviewing evaluations of the effectiveness of a client’s 
control environment. Responses were made on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled “very 
extensive experience” (coded as 9) and “very limited experience” (coded as 1). Documentation 
structure was dummy coded. SUP is coded as 1 for supporting documentation and 0 otherwise. 
                                                 
11 Following previous research (e.g., DeZoort and Salterio 2001; O’Donnell 2002; Brazel and Agoglia 2006), this 
experience measure is obtained through participant self-assessment. 
 15 
 
BAL is coded as 1 for the balanced documentation and 0 otherwise. Thus, the component group 
serves as the baseline condition since hypothesized differences relate to comparisons between it 
and the other groups. TSE*SUP and TSE*BAL represent the interaction between reviewer task-
specific experience and documentation structure.  
Table 2 reports the results from estimating the multiple regression model specified in 
equation (1). Hypothesis 2 predicts that as reviewer task-specific experience (TSE) increases, 
differences in preparer and reviewer assessments of control weaknesses will be greater for the 
component documentation pairings than for the supporting and balanced audit teams. That is, 
experience has the greatest impact when preparers are less effective at identifying significant 
weaknesses in the client’s control environment. Given this hypothesized effect of reviewer 
experience, we expect (and find) that component reviewers’ mean assessments begin to converge 
toward those of the reviewers in other conditions (means = 4.04, 3.92, and 4.60 for the 
supporting, balanced, and component groups, respectively; p = .396). With respect to direct tests 
of H2, we expect significant negative coefficients for both a4 and a5. Table 2 shows that the 
coefficients for the interaction terms (TSE*SUP and TSE*BAL) are in the expected negative 
direction and statistically significant (p = .024 and p = .029, respectively), providing support for 
H2. 12 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Although not hypothesized, we find a similar interactive effect for reviewers’ assessment 
quality. As with preparer assessment quality, reviewer assessment quality is measured by 
computing the mean of absolute deviations of reviewers’ assessments from experts’ assessments 
across the four control environment weaknesses. Using an equation similar to equation (1) in 
                                                 
12 We dichotomize the component group at the median level of reviewer task-specific experience as a further 
illustration of the effect of task-specific experience. Resulting mean assessments for the low and high experience 
reviewers are 5.03 and 3.79, respectively, suggesting that it is the experienced reviewers that are driving this effect. 
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which reviewer assessment quality is substituted for DIFF as the dependent variable, we find that 
task-specific experience (TSE) and documentation structure have an interactive effect on 
reviewer assessment quality (TSE*SUP and TSE*BAL terms are significant at p = .035 and p = 
.056, respectively). That is, as task-specific experience (TSE) increases, component 
documentation reviewers’ assessment quality is less affected by documentation structure. Thus, 
relative to less experienced component reviewers, it appears that not only were experienced 
reviewers’ control weakness judgments less affected by (anchored on) their preparers’ more 
favorable assessments, they were also of higher quality.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
The current regulatory environment (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and SAS No. 
99), brought on by recent high-profile audit failures, emphasizes and expands the auditor’s role 
in detecting and preventing fraud. Sarbanes-Oxley requires management of publicly traded 
companies to assess the effectiveness of their internal controls, and to include this assessment 
with their annual SEC filings. Auditors must now provide an opinion on management’s 
assertions, as well as conduct their own independent assessment of, and issue an opinion on, the 
effectiveness of their client’s internal controls. This increased workload in the new regulatory 
environment has pushed public accounting firms to dramatically increase recruiting, resulting in 
an increase in the ratio of audit staff to audit managers and partners at a time when regulatory 
agencies are recognizing experience as playing a crucial role in the effective assessment of 
internal controls and fraud risk (AICPA 2002; PCAOB 2004a). This is consistent with research 
on auditor experience, which indicates that task-specific experience obtained through specific 
task performance can lead to improved decision-making in a given area (e.g., Bonner 1990). And 
while the structure of workpaper documentation has been shown to affect auditors’ assessments 
 17 
 
of overall fraud risk (Agoglia et al. 2003), prior research has not addressed the role their 
reviewers’ experience plays in mitigating documentation structure effects. 
Our study matches audit workpaper preparers with reviewers to investigate whether 
reviewer task-specific experience moderates the effect of fraud assessment documentation 
structure on the audit review team’s ability to identify significant control weaknesses. Consistent 
with expectations, results indicate preparers using component documentation inappropriately 
assessed weaknesses in the control environment more favorably than those using either 
supporting or balanced documentation. More importantly, reviewer task-specific experience 
moderated the effect of documentation structure on reviewers’ identification of control 
weaknesses such that experienced reviewers compensated more for the effect of component 
documentation than reviewers with less experience. Our results suggest that experienced 
reviewers are better able to overcome challenges presented by documentation structure and more 
effectively assess the impact of control weaknesses than their less experienced counterparts. 
The findings of this study have implications for practice and future research. Given the 
increased expectations with respect to assessing controls facing audit firms today, results of this 
study suggest that they should consider the effect of how their workpapers relating to the 
assessment of control weaknesses are structured. Also, our findings indicate that reviewers with 
greater task-specific experience (relative to those of lesser experience) appear better suited to 
overcome their preparers’ potential control weakness omissions in the workpapers. This suggests 
that the emphasis on experience during the control assessment process prescribed by recent 
pronouncements (e.g., PCAOB 2004a; SAS No. 99) seems well placed. In this study, we 
investigate only a single task/context (i.e., we examine the effects of documentation structure and 
reviewer experience in a control weakness assessment task). Future research could also consider 
 18 
 
reviewer task-specific experience in other contexts and review tasks to determine under which 
tasks/contexts this experience is most critical. In addition, given new requirements relating to 
internal controls, future research should investigate the effect of documentation structure and 
reviewer experience on the auditor’s internal controls opinion decision. Such research will 
further our understanding of the effect of documentation structure and quality on auditor 
judgment.  
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 TABLE 1 
Preparer Control Weakness Assessments 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Analysis of Variance 
 
 
Variablea
Balanced 
(n=18)
Component 
(n=18)
 
F  Statistic
p 
Valueb 
 Supporting 
(n=18)      
  
Mean Assessment of Four 
Control Weaknesses 
 
Mean   
(SD) 
3.89        
1.65 
3.94        
1.50 
5.61          
1.25 
7.930 .001 
Management’s Attitude Toward 
Overriding Controls 
 
Mean   
(SD) 
3.66        
1.78 
3.72        
1.60 
5.39          
1.85 
5.640 .006 
Degree of Management 
Oversight of Control Structure  
 
Mean  
(SD) 
3.78        
1.66 
4.17        
1.75 
5.61          
1.75 
5.640 .006 
Controls to Safeguard Assets 
 
 
Mean   
(SD) 
3.16        
1.58 
3.44        
1.75 
5.16          
1.75 
7.309 .002 
Segregation of Duties 
 
Mean   
(SD) 
4.94        
2.67 
4.44        
2.25 
6.28          
1.67 
3.233 .048 
Quality of Preparer Assessments Mean   
(SD) 
1.69 
1.19 
1.64 
1.06 
2.89 
1.24 
6.602 .003 
 
Panel B: Contrast Tests Between Groups 
 
 
Supporting vs. 
Balanced
Supporting vs. 
Component
Balanced vs. 
ComponentVariable
a
 
   
  
Mean Assessment of Four Control 
Weaknesses  
t-statistic     
p-valueb 
-0.113          
.910 
-3.504          
.0005 
-3.391       
.0005 
Management’s Attitude Toward  
Overriding Controls  
t-statistic     
p-value 
-0.095          
.924 
-2.955          
.003 
-2.860        
.003 
Degree of Management Oversight of 
Control Structure  
t-statistic    
p-value 
-0.676          
.502 
-3.187          
.001 
-2.511        
.008 
Controls to Safeguard Assets 
 
t-statistic     
p-value 
-0.490          
.626 
-3.529 
.0005 
-3.039 
.002 
Segregation of Duties t-statistic     
p-value 
0.671           
.505 
-1.789 
.040 
-2.460 
.009 
Quality of Preparer Assessments t-statistic     
p-value 
0.143 
.887 
-3.073 
.003 
-3.216 
.002 
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a Auditors were asked to assess the likelihood that each fraud risk factor was likely or unlikely to be a 
problem area with regard to the client’s control environment. Assessments were made on 10-point scales, 
ranging from “highly unlikely to be a problem area” (coded as 10) to “highly likely to be a problem area” 
(coded as 1). Thus, lower scores indicate control environment weaknesses. Mean Assessment represents 
participants’ mean responses for the four fraud risk factors (Overriding Controls, Oversight of Control 
Structure, Controls to Safeguard Assets, and Segregation of Duties). Quality of Preparer Assessments is 
computed as the absolute deviation of participants’ assessments from expert assessments of the four 
control weaknesses.  
b All tests are two-tailed except those regarding contrast tests for supporting vs. component and balanced 
vs. component, which are one-tailed due to the directional nature of expectations. 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
TABLE 2 
Regression Results  
 
DIFFi = a0 + a1TSE + a2SUP + a3BAL + a4TSE*SUP + a5TSE*BAL + e 
 
     Expected Sign  b          t-statistic  p-valuea 
a0   N/A  N/A   -2.09      .042  
TSE    +            .64    3.86    <.001   
SUP   N/A            .20      .45      .654  
BAL   N/A            .37      .82      .419 
TSE*SUP (H2) -          - .92   -2.03         .024 
TSE*BAL (H2) -           -.93   -1.95      .029 
 
_____________________ 
 
aOne-tailed p-values are reported where the expected sign is unidirectional.  
    
 
DIFF = measured as preparer’s minus reviewer’s mean assessment for the four control 
environment weaknesses;   
 
TSE = reviewers’ task-specific experience; reviewers indicated their experience reviewing 
evaluations of the effectiveness of a client’s control environment.  Responses were made 
on a 9-point scale, with endpoints labeled “very extensive experience” (coded as 9) and 
“very limited experience” (coded as 1); 
 
SUP = coded 1 for supporting documentation structure, 0 otherwise;   
 
BAL = coded 1 for balanced documentation structure, 0 otherwise;   
 
TSE*SUP = interaction between reviewer task-specific experience and supporting documentation 
structure;  
 
TSE*BAL = interaction between reviewer task-specific experience and balanced documentation 
structure. 
 
